Collaboration: The Future of Governance by Harter, Philip J.
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2009 Issue 2 Article 7 
2009 
Collaboration: The Future of Governance 
Philip J. Harter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The Future of Governance, 2009 J. Disp. Resol. (2009) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/7 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized 
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Collaboration: The Future of
Governance
Philip J. Harter*
The country has been buffeted by bitter political controversy virtually non-
stop for the past fifteen years. Both sides of the divide accuse the other of extrem-
ism and attack its very legitimacy. Civil dialogue, debate, and deliberation have
been replaced by attacks and are close to extinct. On the one side, the political
theater this summer in the Health Care Town Meetings and the loss of decorum in
the House of Representatives are certainly examples. On the other, the current
administration has attacked the previous administration for everything from war
crimes to being so cozy with the financial institutions that it produced the worst
recession in a generation.
A corollary of this is that public policy debates are more contentious, and
hence, making public decisions through legislation or regulation is more difficult
than in quieter times. Yet important issues need to be considered in a relatively
short time frame: what to do about global warming and the limitation on green-
house gases; the manner in which the financial sector is regulated and which firms
will be regulated; the delivery of health care; the rebuilding of our transportation
infrastructure; the role of the federal government in education and the standards
that it may impose. No matter what the ultimate decision as to the particular issue
or the role of the government in addressing it is, some decision needs to be made
in these areas, as well as many others.
But here, too, difficulties arise. Many of our traditional responses are no
longer as effective as they once were, largely because the original targets for
which they were designed have already been addressed or are no longer relevant.
Thus, we need to create new approaches or, in many cases, recognize and hence
legitimize approaches that have recently emerged. By and large, these new struc-
tures will need to be more flexible and adaptive than those deployed in the past.
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Further, many tend to blur any sort of rigid dichotomy between "public"--only
the government-and "private"--only not government. Rather, the two will be
intertwined as to who makes what decisions based on what sort of process and
with what type of participation by the other. As a consequence, we need to look
beyond the procedures and conceptual models we have relied on for seventy-five
years. A new archetype is needed both as to the tools that are available to address
social issues and the procedures by which they will be developed and function.
We are therefore at a critical juncture with respect to the role of government
and how it operates. Resolving this debate will require the careful attention across
society-we as a body politic; government officials; academics; leaders of the
private sector.
The thesis of this paper is that collaboration-the public and private spheres
working together while recognizing the legitimate role of each-should play a
major role in making these important decisions. Can collaboration diminish the
rancor? Certainly not on its own, but it can lead people to recognize that others
are listening and trying to reach appropriate decisions. That alone has powerful
political consequences.' Should the procedures described here be used for all
public decisions? Of course not. But they should be considered for major ones
precisely because they are effective, and a form of collaboration-a recognition
that others have important viewpoints-should indeed pervade decision-making.
Importantly, collaboration calls for strong and confident leadership on the part of
both government and private parties. It is not to be confused with either being a
bully or a wimp.
I. THE PROMISE OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
President Obama issued a Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies on his very first full day in office that says:
Government should be participatory. Public engagement enhances the
Government's effectiveness and improves the quality of its decisions.
Knowledge is widely dispersed in society, and public officials benefit
from having access to that dispersed knowledge. Executive departments
and agencies should offer Americans increased opportunities to partici-
pate in policymaking and to provide their Government with the benefits
1. See Micheal A. Neblo et al., Who Wants to Deliberate And Why? 37 (John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP09-27, Sept. 15, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1476461. Neblo provides experimental evidence
for this proposition:
[M]any citizens are de-mobilized precisely by the peculiarities of partisan and interest-group pol-
itics that political sophisticates take as exclusively constitutive of political participation....
[W]illingness to deliberate is much higher than research in political behavior might suggest, and
that those most willing to deliberate are precisely those turned off by standard partisan and inter-
est group politics. If the standard forms of participation can be embedded in a more deliberative
framework, the tension between the two may well lessen. Far from rendering deliberative demo-
cratic reforms ridiculous or perverse on their own terms, these findings suggest that the delibera-
tive approach represents opportunities for practical reform quite congruent with the aspirations of
normative political theorists and average citizens alike.
[Vol. 2009
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of their collective expertise and information. Executive departments and
agencies should also solicit public input on how we can increase and im-
prove opportunities for public participation in Government.
Government should be collaborative. Collaboration actively engages
Americans in the work of their Government. Executive departments and
agencies should use innovative tools, methods, and systems to cooperate
among themselves, across all levels of Government, and with nonprofit
organizations, businesses, and individuals in the private sector. Execu-
tive departments and agencies should solicit public feedback to assess
and improve their level of collaboration and to identify new opportunities
for cooperation.
2
A little over a week later, he issued another memorandum to heads of agen-
cies announcing that he was going to conduct a thorough review of Executive
Order 12,866, which governs how the White House reviews regulations. 3  As
such, a revised executive order on White House review could have a significant
effect on the practical application of the earlier exhortations to use collaborative
processes by adding both political encouragement and practical enforcement.
It therefore appears that the new administration is seriously considering just
how to harness collaboration as a form of public participation and whether or not
to codify procedures in a new executive order.
This article has an intentionally arrogant title that is a cover-up for some hard
and fast opinions. But I have been thinking about these issues for a long time, and
I thought I would use the opportunity to build on my observations and develop the
resulting ideas. Collaboration is an extraordinarily powerful means for develop-
ing policy to the benefit of the public and private sectors alike. As will be devel-
oped, however, productive, true collaboration is a highly flexible process, but it is
not formless or ad hoc. Rather, some important details need to be addressed;
without them, the effort can fall far short of its potential and may even be counter-
productive. My goal, therefore, is to highlight some of those issues so that the
2. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Transparency and Open
Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009). Another example of the White House's commitment
to Open Government, the Administration announced, via the White House Blog, an initiative popularly
known as White House 2.0. These initiatives included Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace. The goal is to
allow the public to "stay tuned in" to the Administrations workings, both popularly known and not, and
have the public submit their ideas. See Vivek Kunda & Katie Statnton, New Technologies and Partici-
pation (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/bloglNew-Technologies-and-Participation (last visited Nov.
18, 2009). It will be interesting to see where this leads; I, frankly, am skeptical. Wherever it may lead,
it is not the sort of collaboration and exchange of information envisioned in this article.
3. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Regulatory Review, 74
Fed. Reg. 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993). Exec. Order No.
12,866 requires executive branch agencies to submit both proposed and final rules to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
review. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735. The intensity of the review depends on the
impact of the rule as measured against the criteria of the Order. Id. The agency is prohibited from
publishing the proposed or final rule until authorized to do so by OIRA. Id. As a result, if OIRA ob-
jects to part of a proposal, it will negotiate with the agency to reach an agreement on a mutually ac-
ceptable rule. The order provides a means of appeal if the two are unable to reach an agreement, al-
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new administration can capitalize on the full power of using the range of expertise
available.
1I. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
My original article, now more than twenty-five years old, advocated trying
negotiated rulemaking-a form of collaborative governance. 4 The idea was tenta-
tive. Indeed, there was supposed to be a question mark at the end of the title.5 A
major purpose of the undertaking was to encourage the parties to talk and to share
insights in the development of new rules since it was clear they were not doing so
at the time6 and to provide a structure by which that might occur.7 Virtually all of
the theory is equally applicable to other forms of policy, however. Similar issues
arise with respect to the policy dimension of settling cases, such as Superfund's
how to clean up the mess,8 developing permits,9 and crafting public-private rela-
tionships that will implement public issues.
The initial notions were generalized in Jody Freeman's wonderful article,
which dubbed the relationship "collaborative governance," of which reg-neg l° is a
part." So, while many of my examples are from reg-neg, which is the most de-
veloped form of collaborative governance at the federal level, the points are more
broadly applicable. My original article also identified a number of potential prob-
lems: the agency may be reluctant to lose control over the process; the agency
may believe that it is in a better position than a neutral convener to assemble the
negotiators; the process may not reduce the time and resources for a decision; and
the agency may make fundamental changes in the recommendation., 2  These
clearly remain challenges.
4. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982). The Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States subsequently formally recommended the use of nego-
tiated rulemaking. Rules and Regulations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Rec-
ommendation 82-4,47 Fed. Reg. 30,701-01, 30,708 (July 15, 1982).
5. There was also supposed to be a "the" before malaise to indicate it was a term of art in adminis-
trative law instead of a "general sense of depression or unease" as the American Heritage Dictionary
defines it. Somehow, the final copy changes did not get made.
6. A particularly vivid example of that phenomenon arose in the first case I mediated after the
adoption of the ACUS Negotiated Rulemaking recommendation. The standard in question was
OSHA's benzene standard. The negotiations started after the Supreme Court had reversed and re-
manded OSHA's initial standard. By the time the negotiations started, OSHA had been working on the
benzene standard for nine years. Yet the representatives of the major interests had only once been in
the same room together-they all watched the oral arguments at the Court but they certainly did not
speak to each other then.
7. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 4.
8. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT HANDBOOK, available
at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/cag/pdfs/ci-handbook.pdf.
9. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PERMITS--A REFERENCE GUIDE, available at http:l/www.epa.gov/permitspublicguide.pdf.
10. "Reg-neg" is the colloquial term for negotiated rulemaking. The terms are reversed because an
earlier version of the bill that became the Negotiated Rulemaking Act used the term "regulatory nego-
tiation" and the abbreviation arose then.
11. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
(1997).
12. See Harter, supra note 4, at 111-12.
[Vol. 2009
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A vast array of collaborative processes are used at all levels of government
and at all stages of public decision process-policy and adjudicative. One form
that has grown in strength and breadth recently is called "deliberative democra-
cy."' 13 It is designed to strengthen understandings between different groups and
interests-for working out disagreements and to involve a broad range of people
and organizations in meaningful, productive, and respectful ways to ensure public
decisions are responsive to public needs. 14 Techniques run the gamut, from small
discussion groups to broad polling. Many are locally oriented and encourage
citizens to express ideas and needs. Many, indeed probably most, are legislative-
ly-broad policy-oriented. The term "deliberative democracy" is highly popular
at the moment with or without any broadly accepted definition as to just what it is.
Other techniques focus on strengthening and clarifying views of various
groups, 15 resolving cases, 16 setting local goals, 17 resolving land use issues,' 8 or on
tackling issues that transcend statutes or jurisdictions.' 9
Within the regulatory process itself, collaboration can take many forms and
be employed at many different points. It might be used in a "scoping session" to
develop the issues that need to be taken into account in a new rule. Or a "policy
dialogue" or "roundtable" might be held in which the scientific or other important
components are discussed. The group may come together to develop recom-
mendations to the agency concerning a proposed rule, or it might reach an agree-
ment with the agency on the policy itself.21 Each of these techniques has an im-
portant role and contribution, but it is absolutely essential to be clear on the goal
from the outset. The process to be used is a function of the outcome desired. It
13. Carri Hulet, A Glossary of Deliberative Democracy Terms, 12 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 27, 27 (Win-
ter 2006), providing:
Deliberative democracy is a contemporary theory of civic engagement placing public deliberation
at the heart of democratic governance. In contrast to traditional political theories that emphasize
voting for elected representatives, deliberative democrats claim that, to produce democratic out-
comes, citizens should be involved directly in formulating public policy and even in lawmaking.
14. A readily seen example of this are the 21st Century Town Hall meetings, along with many other
components, of the America Speaks organization. See AmericaSpeaks, http://www.americaspeaks.org/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
15. Such as governmental or other regulatory body hearings where interest groups identify (usually
through testimony) and explain their position and what stake the group has in the decision.
16. At the core of collaboration is the ability to settle issues, whether that is through rulemaking or
through adjudicative decision-making. Collaboration can and is utilized in an agency's decision-
making process to settle cases.
17. This is most prevalent in policy issues that are technical in nature and thus "experts" are desira-
ble in order to adequately craft rules. This is seen in environmental issues, such as EPA developing
pollution standards, and economic regulation, such as economists discussing technical aspects of the
market.
18. Such as local subdivision town hall meetings and council meetings for zoning allocation, pro-
posed modifications to the environment, or utilization and allocation of natural resources.
19. Collaboration is useful when the law, or intersection of laws, leads to unclear direction. For
example, collaboration and discussion is important when countries need to determine how differing
national law effects their interaction and dealing with each other on an issue.
20. DEBORAH DALTON & PHILIP J. HARTER, BETER DECISIONS THROUGH CONSULTATION AND
COLLABORATION 11, (U.S. EPA Conflict Prevention and Resolution Center 2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/NCEl/collaboration/.
21. This, of course, is the purpose of a negotiated rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 562 (2006) ("The
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can be counterproductive either to be unclear or vague from the outset or to switch
after the discussions are over.
22
Moreover, there is an ongoing debate as to whether the term "collaborative
governance" includes simply the process of parties with varying interests working
together or whether it requires an actual decision that will be implemented--the
"governance" side of things. I agree with Chris Ansell in his insightful article that
collaborative governance requires an agreement. 23 Indeed, I would augment this
definition with one more observation: part of the agreement must be that it will be
implemented by at least one of the parties to the agreement and that it will be sup-
ported by the rest.24 An agreement is required for seriousness of purpose-talk is
cheap without commitment. I have seen agreements when at least one major party
had no intention of fulfilling any result of the collaboration-it may be the gov-
ernment or may be a private party-but in either event the lack of seriousness
greatly affected the dynamics of the process. You can literally feel the difference
when the decision is real as opposed to merely a recommendation that is distant
from implementation. Numerous times I have watched a group put forward a
recommendation and felt very good about it indeed, only to have it languish or be
picked apart since direct implementation was not part of the agreement. 25
22. Judith Kaleta, Assistant General Counsel and the Dispute Resolution Officer of the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation who has both convened reg negs and represented the Department in them,
quipped: "You have to know where you are going before you can know whether you've arrived!" But
far worse, the manner of participation and of the exchange of information can depend significantly on
the use to be made of it. The prime example of this is when someone can agree to something only if a
condition is met but the agency changes its mind and instead of treating what was done as an agree-
ment, it converts it into a recommendation and then imposes part of the first part of the bargain but
without the underlying precondition. Anyone would be justifiably outraged at such treatment.
This observation has been highlighted in a set of basic principles for agency engagement in environ-
mental conflict resolution and collaborative problem solving that was jointly developed by the Office
of Management and Budget and the Council on Environmental Quality. Those principles include:
"ensure all participants and public are fully informed in a timely manner of the purpose and objectives
of [the] process." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET & COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR
AGENCY ENGAGEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM
SOLVING, available at http://www.ecr.gov/Basics/Principles.aspx.
23. See generally Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice,
18 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 543 (2008).
24. The Basic Principles for Agency Engagement in Environmental Conflict Resolution and Colla-
borative Problem Solving provide: "Implementation- Ensure decisions are implementable consistent
with federal law and policy; parties should commit to identify roles and responsibilities necessary to
implement agreement; ... ensure parties will take steps to implement and obtain resources necessary
to agreement." MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 22.
25. For example, OSHA seems to have a systemic difficulty translating full consensus into a final
rule, and that has generated considerable consternation among the participants to the negotiations, let
alone the beneficiaries of the rule. For particularly vivid, and bitter, accounts of OSHA's inexcusable
and outrageous delay in implementing a full agreement, see Celeste Monforton, Crane Industry Dis-
gusted with OSHA Delay, THE PUMP HANDLE, June 16, 2008, http://thepumphandle.wordpress.com/
2008/06/16/crane-industry-disgusted-with-osha-delay/; see also Susan Podziba, Safety Starts at the
Top, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, at A-31 (Ms. Podziba was the mediator for OSHA's negotiated rule-
making on crane safety standards). The root cause seems to be that there are those in OSHA that think
that only they can reach the right result and that it is illegitimate to have others participate in develop-
ing a standard. Indeed, I have heard OSHA staff make precisely that assertion. That perspective is
particularly interesting given the widespread view concerning OSHA's institutional incompetence.
[Vol. 2009
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III. WHY ENGAGE THE PUBLIC
A. Public Participation and Stakeholder Involvement
"Public participation" and "stakeholder involvement" are popular sentiments
in government circles.26 Agencies virtually always use procedures well beyond
the bare minimum of notice and comment for establishing any policy of signific-
ance, typically affording representatives of those interested in a new policy the
opportunity to interact directly with officials responsible for its development.27
Agencies do so for a variety of reasons:
" Information. Undoubtedly the most significant reason is that the
outreach enhances the knowledge available to the agency when mak-
ing its policy choices. That information is both substantive (illumi-
nating the topic at hand) and political (describing the preferences of
public).
" Customers or clients. Part of the current theory of agency manage-
ment is to view the agency as an organization that provides services
to the public. Thus, the public is seen as analogous to customers of a
commercial firm, in that the agency needs to solicit and be respon-
sive to their wants and needs. Gaining first-hand insight and provid-
ing an opportunity for some sort of dialogue is seen as being respon-
sive.
" Defuse Politicized Situations. Expanding public involvement is one
way of reducing the wrangling that surrounds some controversial
policy choices. While to be sure not everyone will be happy with the
outcome whatever it may be, ensuring that all can readily express
their views can make it more likely that everyone will accept the
outcome as a legitimate decision. Contrariwise, if little outreach is
attempted, those who oppose the outcome will also denounce it as
the product of a flawed, closed process that did not adequately con-
sider opposing views. Further, broad consultation reduces the pres-
26. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT & PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
AT THE U.S. EPA: LESSONS LEARNED, BARRIERS, & INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, EPA-100-R-00-040
(January 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/pdf/sipp.pdf.
27. For example, agencies now routinely accept comments via e-mail, which has greatly reduced the
transaction costs of commenting and enabled virtually anyone who cares about a proposal to submit
their views. Sometimes the number of comments extend into the hundreds of thousands and many are
simply indications of a person's political views as opposed to the presentation of new information or
analysis. Agencies also will regularly hold public meetings to explain a proposal and take public com-
ment. As perhaps an example of this phenomenon: "This is the second notice to producers and users of
veterinary biological products, and other interested individuals, that we will be holding our 13th public
meeting to discuss regulatory and policy issues related to the manufacture, distribution, and use of
veterinary biological products." Veterinary Biologics, 70 Fed. Reg. 5963 (Dep't of Agriculture Feb. 4,
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sure on the agency since it can be made to appear that the decision is
the product of a democratic choice.
28
Democratic Legitimacy. Although administrative law has focused
on increasing public participation at least since the early 1970s, it
has taken on a new emphasis as government has decentralized and
the potential contributions of the private sector have become recog-
nized and embraced. Thus, a more recent reason for stakeholder in-
volvement is the notion that it is more in keeping with democratic
theory if those interested in and affected by a political decision have
an opportunity to express their views to those who will make the de-
cision. Decisions made with greater public participation are seen as
more legitimate than those issued by the agency after minimal out-
reach.
These processes clearly result in a dialogue or negotiation in which the agen-
cy articulates its initial position through a form of consultation, such as public
meetings or workshops, and then publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking; the
public expresses its views in one form or another, the agency next modifies its
proposal, and the whole thing may start over again for several iterations. A form
of negotiation therefore is common in the development of policy. It may be direct
and personal when representatives of one interest meet individually with agency
officials; it may be in the form of an exchange at a public meeting; it may be
through sequenced responses to public comment. But, it is usually either one-
sided or formal and stilted. 29 While "public participation" and "stakeholder in-
volvement" would logically connote that the public actually shares in making the
final decision-after all that is the dictionary definition of "participate' 3° -
typically that is not the case. Instead, the agency remains firmly in control, and
the processes are used as a means of informing the agency-substantively, proce-
durally, and politically.
B. Negotiating the Actual Policy
Experience has shown rather dramatically, however, that considerable bene-
fits can result if the agency actually shares the decision-making by engaging rep-
resentatives of those who will be substantially affected by the policy in its devel-
28. Surely this explains in large part the extraordinary effort the Forest Service has undertaken with
respect to its "Roadless Rule" which would limit the construction of new roads in National Forests.
Overall, the agency conducted more than 600 public meetings and received more than 1.5 million
public comments. Dep't of Agriculture Roadless Area Conservation Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3248
(Jan. 12, 2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
29. A public meeting in which members of the public are limited to a few minutes to explain their
concerns or an expanded notice and comment period, even if it involves the informal media of the
internet, result is in a relatively formal exchange of ideas and information. For example, I regularly ask
my class in Environmental Dispute Resolution if anyone has attended a public meeting and, if so,
whether they left angry because of the lack of a substantive exchange; the answer to both is inevitably
"yes."
30. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 955 (William Morris ed.,
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1976) (participate: take part; join or share with others).
[Vol. 2009
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opment. 3' Thus, what is discussed below is a relatively structured process32 by
which those representatives are identified and assembled to reach agreement on a
policy with the agency that will actually be adopted.33 Doing so frequently results
in considerable benefits.
31. An extensive empirical analysis was conducted that compared rules developed through nego-
tiated rulemaking with similar rules that were developed traditionally. Participants were extensively
interviewed to understand their actual experience with negotiated rulemaking, and it was quite posi-
tive. An analysis of the study concluded:
On balance, the.., study suggests that reg neg is superior to conventional rulemaking on virtual-
ly all of the measures that were considered. Strikingly, the process engenders a significant learn-
ing effect, especially compared to conventional rulemaking; participants report, moreover, that
this learning has long-term value not confined to a particular rulemaking. Most significantly, the
negotiation of rules appears to enhance the legitimacy of outcomes. [The] data indicate that
process matters to perceptions of legitimacy. Moreover.... reg neg participant reports of higher
satisfaction could not be explained by their assessments of the outcome alone. Instead, higher sa-
tisfaction seems to arise in part from a combination of process and substance variables. This sug-
gests a link between procedure and satisfaction, which is consistent with the mounting evidence
in social psychology that "satisfaction is one of the principal consequences of procedural fair-
ness." This potential for procedure to enhance satisfaction may prove especially salutary precise-
ly when participants do not favor outcomes.
Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 60, 121 (2000) (footnotes omitted). This finding was confirmed through an intense analy-
sis of 239 published case studies of stakeholder involvement in environmental decisions. The author
concluded:
The majority of cases contained evidence of stakeholders improving decisions over the status
quo; adding new information, ideas, and analysis; and having adequate access to technical and
scientific resources. Processes that stressed consensus scored higher on substantive quality meas-
ures than those that did not. Indeed, the data suggested interesting relationships between the more
"political" aspects of stakeholder decisionmaking, such as consensus building, and the quality of
decisions.
Thomas C. Beierle, The Quality of Stakeholder-Based Decisions: Lessons from the Case Study Record
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 00-56) (2000), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/
documents/rff-dp-00-56.pdf.
Thus, the actual empirical evidence demonstrates that the consensus process of negotiated rulemak-
ing is highly successful.
Some controversy has arisen, however, over the efficacy of negotiated rulemaking with respect to
saving time and judicial review. Virtually all of it is based on a study in which Professor Cary Coglia-
nese purported to make an empirical analysis of negotiated rulemaking by simply counting days and
found that, based on the numbers he used, that it did not result in rules being developed quicker. Cary
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1255, 1284 (1997). His research fails to take into account what actually happened in the negotia-
tions and the goals of the sponsoring agencies, as opposed to simply assuming, as he did and which
was contrary to fact, that in each instance the agency's endpoint was a notice of proposed rulemaking.
See Philip J. Harter, A Plumber Responds to the Philosophers: A Comment on Professor Menkel-
Meadow's Essay on Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 379, 381-83 (2005). Indeed, when the dy-
namics of what the agency sought are understood, it is clear that reg-neg was fully a third faster than
traditional processes. Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 49 (2000).
32. I emphasize the structure since experience has also shown that the process will not be nearly as
powerful if significant shortcuts are taken. Each of the components that are outlined below serves an
important purpose. See Philip J. Harter, Fear of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1389, 1404 (1997) (beginning the discussion of the necessity of paying heed to how the negotia-
tors are assembled and the orientation of the entire process).
33. As will be discussed below, some policies, such as rules, require additional procedures before
they can become final. It may be that during this process the agency will be required to change the
decision it made during the negotiations or, indeed, the agency may-and is constitutionally entitled
to-change its mind before the policy is finally adopted. The distinction between this process and the
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An agency might choose to use direct negotiations among the affected inter-
ests for any of several reasons:
Agency is stuck. The agency may be ensnared in controversy and
simply unable to issue a final decision on the subject. It may try and
yet be stopped before fruition. Frequently, such situations arise
when a significant party feels that its views have not been heeded
sufficiently. Gathering the relevant parties together enables them to
work together, with the agency, and under the policy limits imposed
by the authorizing statutes to work out a mutually agreeable solution.
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) was unable to revise its antiquated standard governing steel
erection until it empanelled a negotiated rulemaking committee to
develop the standard. When the Steel Erection Negotiated Rulemak-
ing Advisory Committee reached consensus on an extraordinarily
controversial rule, the issue had been on OSHA's docket for nearly
'twenty years, and OSHA itself had failed on two attempts to revise
the standard.34 Similarly, the Federal Aviation Administration un-
successfully tried several times to revise its standards governing
flight time and duty time of pilots, 35 until achieving its goal through
negotiated rulemaking.
" Diminish Debilitating Controversy. It is certainly not unusual for
political controversy to swirl around important regulatory decisions.
Oftentimes, the controversy will cause some parties to build power
in an attempt either to positively achieve its policy goal or to stop
one it opposes. The volume of the discord can escalate precisely be-
cause the parties are attempting to sway those who will decide. Di-
rectly involving those affected in the decision can focus those ener-
gies and diminish the resulting entropy.
" Acquire Better Information. The information that is necessary to de-
velop a good rule may be unique to the private sector. That could be
hard data, "know-how," or insight as to how to address a particular
problem. It may be that the best way to deploy that information is to
involve those who have it in the deliberations. Otherwise, compa-
nies may be reluctant to reveal their information for fear that it will
direct negotiations with the interested parties in a quest to reach a consensus-private and public
participants alike-on a new policy.
34. OSHA Construction Safety and Health Standards for Steel Erection, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926 (2001).
35. As Neil Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation and Enforcement of the Department of
Transportation explained:
The FAA was twice unsuccessful in getting to a final rule with the normal process. They were
not sure they could ever successfully use the normal process to get to a rule. So they tried reg-neg
and got to a final rule .... Similarly with the Chicago drawbridge rule, the [Coast Guard] kept
getting sued and losing and having to start over.
Interview with Neil Eisner, Assistant Gen. Counsel for Regulation and Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of
Transp.; and Chair, President's Comm. on Negotiated Rulemaking (as described in Harter, Assessing
the Assessors, supra note 31, at 45 n.65).
[Vol. 2009
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/7
be used against them in some inappropriate way.36 Typically, thesesituations arise in technical, state-of-the-art issues.
No Clear Choice. It may be that after the agency has conducted its
initial investigation and research into the topic, no clear direction
emerges but rather several alternatives, each with positive and nega-
tive attributes so that there is no clear policy alternative. In such a
situation, the agency may wish to engage those who will be affected
by the decision to see if others have insights that can lead to one
route being seen as optimal.
" Political Legitimacy. As with public participation and stakeholder
involvement, direct negotiations among the interests that lead to an
actual decision (instead of mere consultation) is a way to achieve po-
litical legitimacy-indeed a far better way. The ensuing agreement
has an important legitimacy that stems from the simple result of who
made it.
" Changing Public-Private Relationship. Although the public and pri-
vate spheres have never been as separate as is sometimes alleged,
over the past several years it has been recognized that the two are far
more interdependent than previously envisioned. The private sector
is in fact responsible for a considerable amount of standard setting
and enforcement, often with the prodding and oversight of the gov-
ernment; likewise, the government is often quite dependent on the
private sector to accomplish its goals. 37 In fact, much of what is
commonly thought of as government-imposed regulation is, in fact, a
series of negotiated agreements. Moreover, command-and-control
regulation has largely run its course, so new approaches are needed.
The use of direct negotiations among representatives of the affected
interests is a means of implementing this newly articulated relation-
ship.
" Synergy. Overarching all of the other advantages of direct negotia-
tions is the synergy that results when a group of individuals with ex-
perience, insight, and interest in a common issue come together to
36. For example, in one negotiated rulemaking in which I served as the mediator, a group of compa-
nies could agree to undertake something but only if certain specified conditions were also met. They
would clearly not have been willing to come forward and describe their ability to undertake this action
in response to a traditional notice and comment rulemaking since they could not be assured that the
necessary condition would be met. Such assurance could be provided, however, in the direct negotia-
tions. I have personally witnessed similar circumstances several times. As a variant on this theme, a
trade association recently took the position during negotiations with a congressional committee that it
would readily agree to a statutory requirement that the appropriate agency issue a rule but only if the
legislation also provided that rule be developed through negotiated rulemaking.
37. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and Rise of Governance in Con-
temporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343-44 (2004); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
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solve the problem in a mutually acceptable manner. 38 They can sti-
mulate each other's thinking; foster creative ideas; refine and extend
promising leads while weeding out less promising suggestions; de-
termine what information is necessary for a responsible decision
without wasting time and expense on unnecessary defensive work
and actually obtain that data; or determine what approach will yield
"the biggest bang for the buck."
Better Rules. Indeed, using collaboration frequently results in consi-
derable benefits. For example, many of the negotiated rules I am
familiar with are both more stringent and yet cheaper to implement
than would have been the case had the agency used traditional rule-
making. How could that be? The answer is, to a very real extent,
the wisdom of crowds or the benefits of a variety of expertise: those
who prepare the rule have the benefit of a "shop floor expertise"-
practical insights into how to solve the problem-and hence are able
to judge the biggest bang for the buck. This form of participation
and the resulting negotiations lead to an elusive theoretical benefit
that actually materializes: an ability to reach the "sweet spot" in
regulatory decisions. It is the means of overcoming the Coasean di-
lenma as to how to reach the point in regulation where the marginal
costs equal the marginal benefits precisely because it sets up the bar-
gaining posited by Coase, 39 which is virtually impossible to achieve
in customary regulatory proceedings. By its nature, such a rule is
designed to reach Pareto optimal values.40  Thus, agency officials
yield their putative power to impose a unilateral decision as an in-
vestment in making a better one that will be implemented.
In short, agencies use direct negotiations to achieve better results in complex,
controversial issues.
38. The question might logically be asked just why the parties would do this as opposed to fight the
imposition of a rule or other policy. In these cases, the agency has the authority to make the policy and
will at least attempt to do so. Moreover, as will be discussed further below, all the parties taken togeth-
er have sufficient countervailing power that the outcome is in doubt. Thus, no one party can be sure of
what will result, other than the fact that something likely will happen. It is therefore in each party's
interest to participate in the negotiations as a means of controlling-or at least participating in-the
outcome. It is this threat of government action that is essential to stimulating the type of involvement
described here. It is, therefore, a "stimulated collaboration." To put the matter in dispute resolution
terms, each party's BATNA (see discussion, infra at IV.G) is what will happen when the policy choice
is made; but that is unknown given the countervailing power. In that case, it is in their interest to help
craft that choice.
39. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,2 (1960).
40. "Pareto efficiency, also referred to as allocative efficiency, occurs when resources are so allo-
cated that it is not possible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off."
OECD.org, OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?lD=-3275
(last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
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Collaboration
lV. THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING POLICY
So much of the discussion of collaborative governance is at a high level of
abstraction or philosophy. Before one can be serious about it, however, one needs
to understand or at least examine a bit of plumbing: the details are important.
Ironically, even those who are ardent supporters of collaboration often overlook
the essential details.4' But, as was urged early on, some important fixed points-
nodes in the system-need to be addressed. Thus, before we can fully appreciate
collaborative governance, we need to examine a bit of just how it is done.
Federal agencies are authorized to use alternative means of dispute resolution
to resolve issues in controversy that relate to an administrative program. The
Negotiated Rulemaking Act (Act) makes this general authority explicit with re-
spect to developing regulations via consensus among the interests that would be
significantly affected by the rule.43 The Act then sets out the procedures to be
followed in negotiating a consensus on a proposed rule.44 While the Act only
addresses negotiating rules,45 the same process can be used to develop other forms
of policy. What follows is an elaboration on that process.
A. Purpose
In a negotiated rulemaking, representatives of the interests that will be signif-
icantly affected by the rule negotiate a consensus-an actual agreement-on a
proposed rule or policy. The agency typically agrees to use the agreement as the
basis for a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), and the private parties agree
to support that proposal. The agency will also frequently express its intent to
issue a final rule based on the notice and hence on the agreement.
46
B. A Representative Democracy
The quest in putting together the committee that will negotiate the rule or pol-
icy is to assemble a group of individuals who together represent the interests that
will be significantly affected by it. While to be sure not every interest, narrowly
defined, will be identified, the goal is to ensure that together the members will
41. See, e.g., Harter, A Plumber Responds to the Philosophers, supra note 31, at 381.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 572(a) (2006).
43. Id. §§ 561, 563(a)(2). Section 563 provides: "An agency may establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee to negotiate and develop a proposed rule, if the head of the agency determines that the use
of the negotiated mlemaking procedure is in the public interest." id. § 563(a).
44. See id. §§ 563-566. The Act makes clear, however, that while it provides a "safe harbor" of
authorized and recommended procedures, it "should [not] be construed as an attempt to limit innova-
tion and experimentation with the negotiated rulemaking process or with other innovative rulemaking
procedures otherwise authorized by law." Id. § 561.
45. When the procedures of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act are followed, the process is formally
known as "negotiated rulemaking."
46. See, e.g., Ground Rules of the Liquefied Compressed Gas Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory
Comm. of the Research and Special Programs Admin. § 5(h) (Dep't. of Transp.) (on file with author)
("Recognizing that it is DOT's responsibility to issue safety regulations, DOT intends to issue a final
rule that is based on the written agreement concurred in by the Committee as modified pursuant to
Paragraph (e)."). The modification that is mentioned recognizes that the agency may be required to
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raise and debate the important facts and policies. It should be such that anyone
who has an interest in the decision will be able to point to someone on the com-
mittee, or several on the committee, who will represent that person's views. Thus
all may be assured that the issues of importance to them will in fact be ventilated
during the deliberations on the policy.
The customary way of apportioning representatives in a democracy is by geo-
graphy. The territory is divided up into funny looking shapes that are often rigged
to enhance a political outcome, and a representative is chosen from within each of
these polygons. In this process, people in a district whose views are shared by
only forty-nine percent of the population can be relatively confident that their
views will not be considered at all in the legislative meeting, unless by happens-
tance a representative from another district does so. In the case of negotiated
rulemaking, instead of the territory being divided geographically, it is divided by
interests.47 Different interests will have different representatives, and together-
just as the geographical model-everyone is included in some group or another.
And, this way, all can be assured that their interests will in fact be raised and con-
sidered in the plenary session instead of being suppressed because it is a minority
view. The goal of assembling the committee, therefore, is to collect sufficient
representatives that together they will in fact represent the general populace.
48
Putting together the committee must recognize the relative benefits and roles
of the public and private spheres and indeed the extent to which they are intert-
wined. The government reflects the public will as distilled through the legislature.
As such, it sets-and enforces-the goals and boundaries of the result and conse-
quently the deliberations themselves. 49 It customarily is the one that gathers and
analyzes the data that will be used to inform the decision, although to be sure it
will be refined by the other participants. Since the agency is the one with the
ultimate clout, it will be the one to push recalcitrant players as to the need for
change. 50 The private parties bring their insights into what is needed and how to
achieve those goals; they provide the state of the art. And it is they who will feel
the effects, both positive and negative, of the policy. The negotiations, therefore,
are a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on the hoof; perhaps more poignantly, CBA as
currently practiced is a surrogate for this form of direct participation. Another
dimension of the private sector activity is the opportunity for the beneficiaries and
their nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to push for their views in implemen-
tation.
47. Note, importantly, that this process does not give undue sway to any "special interests" or "fac-
tions" as Madison called them precisely because everyone is represented in the negotiation and no
interest is accorded special treatment. Indeed, the very fact that the opposing interests will be at the
table will serve to sharpen and refine the debate into a better policy.
48. Of course, not everyone will in fact be represented. But, if the committee is assembled appro-
priately, the information base on which the decision is made will be far broader than would result
without the outreach of convening, and those who think their views were not considered will still be
able to submit them in the ensuing comment period.
49. For example, one of the goals is to "communicate agency authorities, requirements, and con-
straints." MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 22, at 1.
50. It is an "If you don't, we will," situation.
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C. Convening-Assembling the Committee
What follows is based on reg-neg, but it applies to any collaborative process
in varying degrees of intensity. Some of the major questions underlying any col-
laboration are the following: Who were the collaborators? Was anyone left out?
If so, why? Was it padded with friends and compliant folks? If so, why? How
hard did anyone look when seeking diverse views? These questions are critical
since the value of what you have depends on who produced it, both inclusively
and exclusively.
Congregating the committee is an essential element of the reg-neg process. It
is critical for three reasons. First, it is a must for political legitimacy to be sure
that the appropriate interests will in fact be represented in the deliberations and the
resulting agreement. Second, it is important in order to acquire the full range of
insight and information on which to base the decision. Third, it is necessary to
ensure that your handiwork does not get knocked down. I have seen several in-
stances when parties were intentionally excluded, only to have them attack the
proposal after the fact. While the sponsors appeared shocked at the explosion, it
was certainly no surprise to any informed observer.
Thus, someone-called the "convener" 5 '-needs to make a concerted effort
to identify what issues will be raised by the rule and what interests will be signifi-
cantly affected by it.52 To be effective, the convener needs to be rigorously impar-
tial with respect to the policy being developed 53 so that he or she can speak can-
didly and confidentially with the potential parties about their interests and con-
cerns.54 As a result, the convener is often someone from outside the agency.
Parties need to be candid with the convener, and the convener needs to be
candid with the agency. If a party tries to game the convener, it will be caught,
and it will likely lead to delay and problems. And if the convener and the agency
do not deal with each other in a relationship of mutual trust, bad things can hap-
pen.
For example, the relationship between agency and convener needs to preserve
confidentiality. 55 At the moment, however, an agency is demanding that its neu-
51. A "'convener' [is] a person who impartially assists an agency in determining whether estab-
lishment of a negotiated rulemaking committee is feasible and appropriate in a particular rulemaking."
5 U.S.C. § 562(3) (2006).
52. See id. § 563(b).
53. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) provides:
[a] neutral may be a permanent or temporary officer or employee of the Federal Government or
any other individual who is acceptable to the parties to a dispute resolution proceeding. A neutral
shall have no official, financial, or personal conflict of interest with respect to issues in contro-
versy, unless such interest is fully disclosed in writing to all parties and all parties agree that the
neutral may serve.
5 U.S.C. § 573(a). A convener is a neutral under ADRA. Id. § 562(3).
54. A party may be reluctant to share information that would get back to the agency with attribution,
which makes confidentiality important.
55. Sometimes, the convener will secure important confidential information from parties that they
would not share with the agency for a variety of reasons, only to have the agency demand that the
convener reveal everything. The potential conflict between promising a party confidentiality and
having an agency demand that all information be turned over is examined in Philip J. Harter, Neither
Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confi-
dentiality, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 320-24 (1989). This article underlies the confidentiality section of
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tral turn over all notes of confidential discussions the neutral had with the parties.
The demand is substantively absurd since it flies in the teeth of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act. Indeed the goal of the agency and its hysteria over the
issue are truly bizarre. It is bad lawyering and bad policy that together taints a
powerful process: why would anyone trust such an agency in the future?
The convener conducts independent research but predominately gains insight
into the political dynamics of the issue by talking to those-including the agen-
cy-who will be affected. Convening does not simply rely on "the usual sus-
pects" to come forward, which would reward the organized repeat players, but
rather is a focused form of outreach. The convener works with those interests in
identifying the issues that need to be resolved 56 and individuals who can suitably
represent each of the interests.57 Since this is a representative process, it is up to
58each interest to select its representative, not to the agency in appointing one.
As part of the process, the convener also assesses whether it would be likely
that a committee could be assembled that would reach agreement on the policy.
Criteria have developed over the years to predict when collaboration might be
successful in reaching an agreement. There are a number of ways of stating them;
by and large they are aimed at determining whether the parties have an incentive
to converge. Factors that enter into that recommendation are:
" Are there a limited number of interests that will be significantly af-
fected? The Negotiated Rulemaking Act provides that the commit-
tee should be limited to twenty-five participants unless the agency
head determines that more are needed to ensure balanced member-
ship.59
" Whether appropriate individuals can represent those interests.
" Whether the issues are known, mature, and ripe for decision. Basi-
cally, this means that the issue is on the political agenda: some deci-
56. Not infrequently those in the private sector will have different views as to what is important or
place different emphases on the issues. Convening identifies these differences up front so they can
form the basis for the negotiations.
57. It may be that no individual would have the incentive to participate in the negotiations since the
individual stake is so small even if the aggregate amount for the constituency as a whole might be very
large. In such a case it may be possible that a "surrogate" could be found that would have the same
interests as that of the constituency. For example, in the negotiations that led to EPA's Reformulated
Gasoline Standard, it was clear from the outset that the resulting rule would raise the price of gasoline.
In the aggregate the price increase might total $10 billion per year, yet most individuals would only
incur $200 or so of increased costs-hardly enough to merit spending several months negotiating the
standard. But there are organizations that buy millions of gallons of gasoline, and they have a signifi-
cant incentive to participate. In the process, they also represent the average consumer. Similarly, an
insurance company may be a suitable representative in a proceeding involving safety.
58. For some reason, agencies sometimes think they can better select the representatives than can the
parties themselves. My strong guess is that this is done to ensure compliant folks at the table, but it is
at the cost of destroying the notion of a representative democracy and along with it the leadership that
comes from having one's own representative at the table. My strong hunch is that negotiations in
which this occurs are not nearly as productive as they should be.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 565(b) (2006). A member of the committee may also represent a caucus of allied
interests, each with a slightly different orientation within that interest. Experience has shown that
committees get a bit unwieldy if they are larger than twenty-five.
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sion will be made in the relatively near future. This provides a sense
of urgency or a deadline that can inspire interests to participate pre-
cisely so they can share in making the actual decision as opposed to
trusting their fate to others making suitable choices.
Whether a party will have to compromise a fundamental value-one
that goes to the core of its existence. These are akin to articles of
faith or belief. For example, one does not negotiate which of several
religions is better. Nor would it be appropriate in a negotiation to
ask a company simply to go out of business or an environmental or-
ganization to sanction intentional pollution. Each would violate the
very basis for the organization's existence. Fundamental does not
mean large, even very large, or important. It means an essential
component of the organization or interest.
60
" Whether the rule involves diverse issues of varying importance to
the parties.
" Whether the outcome is genuinely in doubt. This can result, for ex-
ample, if there is countervailing power on the committee so that no
interest can achieve what it wants without incurring a sanction it is
unwilling to accept. If one of the parties could achieve its goal di-
rectly, then it will do so and there is no point in engaging in negotia-
tions.61
" Whether the parties view it in their interest to engage in the negotia-
tions. Negotiation-here as elsewhere--is a voluntary process that
parties engage in to make themselves better off. Thus, if some par-
ties are forced to the table, they are not likely to be productive partic-
ipants. Instead, the decision should be made as to whether those
who think the negotiations should not go forward are indispensable
parties, either because the interests they represent are essential or be-
cause they might have the wherewithal to prevent any resulting
agreement from being implemented.
" Is the agency willing to rely on the process to develop the policy 62
and to participate fully and robustly as a member of the commit-
60. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 4th ed. 2000).
61. It is sometimes hard for agency officials to accept or admit that it may be difficult for the agency
to issue the policy directly because other interests will be able to delay or change it.
62. Agencies are nothing if not extraordinarily creative in sabotaging that which they do not like. If
an agency feels forced to use collaboration, it might well say, send us the report and we'll get back to
you in five years or so (alas, that isn't so far-fetched given OSHA's experience with several reg-negs
that it willing convened that reached full agreement) or we only changed a few words-like the essen-
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tee? 63 Do the political appointees and the staff more or less agree on
the important issues, and are they willing to work together?
The convener then prepares a report with recommendations to the agency.
64
The report describes the issues that need to be addressed when developing the
policy; 65 identifies the interests that will be significantly affected; analyzes wheth-
er the criteria are met for predicting a successful outcome to the negotiations; and,
assuming the conclusion is positive, makes a recommendation as to an appropriate
committee. 6 6 The report is a public document 67 and is usually distributed to eve-
ryone the convener interviewed. It serves the important role of providing a com-
mon information base to those who will engage in the negotiations: everyone will
then have a common understanding of the issues that will be on the table, of the
varying interests that will be involved, and of the information that is likely to be
important for reaching a responsible agreement. This has two important func-
tions. First, it reduces the parties' anxiety as they approach the negotiations since
they now know what is on the table (and perhaps even more important, what is not
on the table). Second, it greatly expedites the negotiations themselves since the
parties do not have to establish that common understanding as part of the negotia-
tions but instead can begin immediately with the substance.
D. Notice of Intent
While the convening, if done right, customarily identifies interests, individu-
als, and issues that neither the agency nor others who were initially involved
would have thought of, there is no way any convening can identify everyone or
each interest. Since the negotiations can be perceived as an exercise of a repre-
sentative democracy, each interest needs to have the opportunity to participate
should it wish. To that end, the next stage of a reg-neg is the publication of a
notice both in the Federal Register and in other publications that are likely to be
read by those affected. 6 8 The notice announces the agency's intent to negotiate
the rule and describes the issues that are anticipated to be involved in its develop-
ment. 69 It also lists the interests that were initially identified and proposes a sche-
dule for the activities of the committee. 70 Finally, it solicits comments both on the
preliminary decision to negotiate the rule and on the proposed membership of the
committee.]7 Critically, it must provide an explanation as to how those who think
they would be significantly affected by the rule but who are not represented on the
committee may apply for membership.
72
63. See supra note 26, and infra, W.E.-G..
64. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b)(2).
65. Id. § 563(b)(1)(B). While, to be sure, the agency generally has a very good grasp on those issues,
sometimes during convening the private parties have different views as to what is important. That
range of perspectives is articulated in the report.
66. Id. § 563(b)(2).
67. See id.
68. Id. § 564(a).
69. Id. § 564(a)(1).
70. Id. § 564(a)(5).
71. Id. § 564 (a)(7).
72. Id. § 564(b).
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An important function of the notice is that it means none can be excluded
from the committee (unless, of course, one applied and was denied member-
ship).73 It also means that if some want to participate, they will need to do so in
the negotiations as opposed to waiting until later.
The notice serves the vital function of a check on the accountability of the
convener that ensures the job was done right.
E. Formal Establishment of the Committee
A reg-neg committee is formally an advisory committee and hence governed
by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).74 Thus, the agency must pre-
pare a charter describing its activities and have it approved both within the agency
and by the General Services Administration (GSA).75 One of FACA's require-
ments is that the membership of the committee must be fairly balanced in terms of
the views represented.76 That is sometimes construed as requiring a roughly equal
number of those espousing each point of view so that no one view can out vote the
others. As described below, a negotiated rulemaking functions by consensus 77 so
that each interest has a veto over the decision; as a result, voting is not important.
Numerical balance is therefore not nearly as important for a reg-neg committee as
for a committee that makes decisions by majority vote. What is important, how-
ever, is that there are enough representatives of each perspective so that no com-
mittee member will feel overwhelmed and unable to make a point because of the
sheer weight of those with opposing viewpoints.
F. Role of the Agency
The agency plays an absolutely critical role in a negotiated rulemaking. If it
does not take its obligation seriously, both substantively and procedurally, the
result will be neither legitimate nor successful. The agency, after all, represents
the sovereign in the negotiations. It is responsible for implementing, for better or
73. The D.C. Circuit has held that someone who wanted to be on a reg neg committee but who was
not selected lacks standing to challenge the composition of the committee. Ctr. for Law and Educ. v.
Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1155-61 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
74. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006). "In establishing and administering [a negotiated rulemaking] commit-
tee, the agency shall comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act [5 U.S.C. app 2.] with respect
to such committee, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter." Id. § 565(a)(1).
75. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 7; 41 CFR § 102-3.100. For a general de-
scription of what is required before an advisory committee can actually meet to develop a recommen-
dation to an agency, see the brochure published by GSA. See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICY, THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT
(FACA) BROCHURE IT 4, 9-10 (2009) available at http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?
contentType=GSABASIC&contentld= 11869&noc=T.
76. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2).
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3)(B). For a further discussion of how consensus works, see infra § IV.I.
78. That is, if an agency were to simply rubber stamp a decision made by a committee without its
active participation, it would be no more legitimate than if the agency were to adopt a proposal submit-
ted by a party or group of parties in a Notice and Comment proceeding. Instead, legitimacy comes
through deliberation and careful consideration on the part of the agency, be it in a negotiation or in the
hierarchical process of traditional APA rulemaking. While the result would likely be more balanced
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for worse, the policy choices made by the body politic as embodied in legislation.
Statutes typically afford considerable latitude in making policy choices, and agen-
cies enjoy broad discretion in enforcement matters. Organic statutes rarely dictate
a single "right" answer, but rather they usually afford leeway as to how to achieve
the statutory goal. That is the stuff of negotiation: it is the agency's obligation to
ensure that the result is within the bounds of the statute,79 and the negotiations
concern how to get to the desired goal. Thus, the agency is clearly the primary
player in a negotiation-the first among equals. That is the case not just because
the agency represents the government, but because the agency will forcibly im-
plement the decision.
80
But it would destroy the entire purpose of a negotiation if the agency were to
attempt to dictate a result. That would not only undermine the very function of
the negotiation-which is to build on the collective expertise and acceptance of
the committee and its constituents-but it will also likely result in angering com-
mittee members; since they would feel the agency misled them into believing they
could contribute to the development of a policy important to them. Since the pri-
vate parties customarily deal with the agency in a hierarchical manner in which
the agency alone makes the decision, they frequently are not accustomed to an
open give-and-take among committee members. Thus, while the agency needs to
79. That said, it is also appropriate to provide some deference to a committee's collective judgment
that its decision is within the statutory precepts. For example, Patricia M. Wald, formerly Chief Judge
of the D.C. Circuit, wrote:
My own feeling is that the court should be able to take account of consensus as a factor suggest-
ing the reasonableness of the rule. That in turn may justify a more modest amount of factual justi-
fication and explanation of rationale than is required in the usual statement of basis and purpose
for a rule. When the agency follows that course, however, it always runs some risk that an outlier,
or even one who has previously signed on, will later bring a challenge on the merits or even chal-
lenge the negotiation process during the comment period. And the reviewing court must still have
an irreducible minimum of backup evidence; one can't expect courts to abdicate their responsibil-
ity of ensuring that the agency has given some plausible reasons for all aspects of the rule that
affect the public interest. A reviewing court must be ever mindful of the bare possibility that the
parties have conducted their horse-trading without regard for some public interest meant to be
protected by the statute. Indeed, the best insurance against reg neg deteriorating into the interest-
bargaining paradigm.., lies in the requirement that judicial review accord with the APA's base-
line standards of rationality.
Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE L.J. 1445, 1468 (1997).
The prospect of judicial review is certainly a powerful incentive for the parties to adhere to the vari-
ous requirements. That said, however, if a rule is developed through the deliberation of a diverse group
which reaches a consensus that it is within the scope of the authorizing statute, it would seem appropri-
ate for a reviewing court to provide at least a bit of play in the statutory interpretation. As I argued in
an earlier article, after reviewing a number of the points of judicial review, "If [the] range of interests
is broad enough so that one may be confident that the relevant issues are raised and thrashed out, the
court should at least require a challenger to come up with a good explanation as to why" the interpreta-
tion in invalid. Philip J. Harter, The Role of Courts in Regulatory Negotiation-A Response to Judge
Wald, II COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 51, 69 (1986). (Given the respective dates, this article was obviously
part of an earlier exchange and was not in response to the one above.).
Further, the very process by which the committee functions ensures that its decision will not likely
stray from a statutory mandate. See infra § IV.I.
80. Reg-negs are decisions about employing force, coercion; they direct private sector participants as
to what must be done and determine the fights of beneficiaries. It is therefore essential that they comp-
ly with the criteria that the citizenry has decided are appropriate. If, on the other hand, the decision to
be made lacks force and is to be implemented "voluntarily," then the government's role is different and
its participation in such a negotiation-such as the development of a consensus standard-is as an
interested party with insight and expertise, but not as one implementing a collective will.
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guide the negotiations and determine its boundaries, it often needs to stimulate
that discussion, encouraging the parties to put forth ideas and assuring them that it
is "safe" to talk. It is precisely the resulting synergy that is so important and bene-
ficial in developing a powerful result.
Since the parties-public and private alike-work together to develop a mu-
tually acceptable policy, the process is seen as a form of collaboration, as a form
of "collaborative governance," 8 in which responsibilities are shared between
public and private spheres. It is indeed that, but it is more. It is a "stimulated
collaboration" since one of the parties-the agency-has the authority and re-
sponsibility to achieve a societally determined goal, and the threat that it may act
can be a major stimulus towards undertaking the collaborative effort and keeping
it within bounds.
G. Agency Must Be an Active Participant
Sometimes the agency takes the position in a negotiation among its stake-
holders that it will accept and implement the result if all of them agree to a partic-
ular outcome. The reasoning, of course, is that the parties would not agree to
anything outside the statutory mandate, and if all of them agreed, it must be a
good result. If that is the agency's view, it then takes a passive role in the negotia-
tions, frequently serving almost as an observer. The agency often says that it will
remain silent so as not to interfere with the ability of the private representatives in
reaching an agreement.
This attitude and behavior are problematic for three reasons:
" As has already been argued, a major component of the legitimacy of
a negotiated policy is that the agency has made its own decision that
it fits within the agency's authority.
" If the agency itself is passive, then it is not able to enhance its own
interests in the negotiation, whatever they may be.
" Instead of fostering convergence, the agency's lack of robust partici-
pation actually inhibits the committee from reaching agreement.
While this is certainly counterintuitive, it results directly from nego-
tiation theory. The only reason parties negotiate is to improve their
positions. In order to improve your position, you must have a fairly
decent idea as to what will happen if you are not able to negotiate an
agreement. Or, in the now popular term coined by Fisher and Ury,
82
each party needs to determine its best alternative to a negotiated
agreement (BATNA). Since the premise of the negotiation is that a
decision on a new regulation will likely be made in the near future, a
81. See Freeman, supra note 1I, at 2 ("Collaborative governance requires problem solving, broad
participation, provisional solutions, the sharing of regulatory responsibility across the public-private
divide, and a flexible, engaged agency.").
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party's BATNA is its prediction as to what the regulation will pro-
vide if the negotiations are not successful. But the agency, the one
that presumably would issue the rule, remains silent, so none can de-
termine its BATNA, and hence none can determine what position it
should take in the negotiations. The classic response to that dilemma
is to continue discussions in the hope that the situation will be clear-
er; the parties keep talking but do not converge. And, alas, that is
precisely the situation that usually happens when the agency remains
passive in a negotiation.
83
The agency therefore needs to play a carefully balanced role: it needs to ac-
tively stimulate creative problem solving, participate robustly in the problem solv-
ing, and not be perceived as dictating the result.
H. The Mediator
This is not the place to discuss the role and qualities of a good mediator.
84
But, given the primacy of the agency's representative in a policy negotiation, the
roles of the agency and the mediator can sometimes be confounded.
The negotiations take place in two dimensions: substantive (what is being
decided) and procedural (how is the decision being made). The agency's lead role
is in the substantive arena; it needs to guide and shape the substantive outcome of
the deliberations. If the process is to function well, however, the mediator needs
to be in the control of the procedural dimension. The committee, including the
agency, needs to authorize the mediator to lead and stimulate the committee into
making a creative, informed decision. That may at times require the mediator to
deliver bad news or to push a party or to point out inappropriate behavior. To do
so, the mediator needs to be trusted by all of the parties and not be seen as an
agent of one of them. Thus, the process breaks down if anyone-in this case,
especially the agency-tries to direct or control the behavior of the mediator in an
effort to influence the conduct of the negotiations. If that does happen, other par-
ties will likely not be as forthcoming or open as they otherwise would and conver-
gence into a good rule is less likely. Moreover, allowing the mediator to take the
lead procedurally frees the agency to focus on its primary goal, that of the sub-
stance of the rule.
To function effectively, the parties need to regard the mediator as an indepen-
dent professional who is equipped by education and experience to guide the com-
mittee towards the resolution of a complex, controversial issue of high impor-
83. 1 have personally observed the phenomenon several times. The first time I saw it, I thought it
was odd since the agency had provided full freedom to come up with a creative solution. Exactly the
same thing happened the second time I was in a negotiation where the agency was passive. I then
concluded that the first was not an aberration and that led to the preceding analysis that explained it.
84. In addition to the general literature on mediation, see SOC'Y OF PROF'LS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, BEST PRACTICES FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: GUIDELINES FOR USING
COLLABORATIVE AGREEMENT-SEEKING PROCESSES (1997), available at http://acmet.orglacrlibrary/
more.php?id=130_1 0_M.; see also SOC'Y OF PROF'LS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, COMPETENCIES FOR
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tance. Otherwise the mediator's effectiveness is significantly curtailed, and the
role is reduced to that of a facilitator at best.
L Consensus
Consensus is often misunderstood. It is typically used, derisively, to mean a
group decision that is the consequence of a "group think" that resulted from little
or no exploration of the issues, with neither general inquiry, discussion, nor deli-
beration. A common example would be the boss's saying, "Do we all agree?...
Good, we have a consensus!" In this context, consensus is the acquiescence to an
accepted point of view. It is, as is often alleged, the lowest common denominator
that is developed precisely to avoid controversy as opposed to generating a better
answer. It is a decision resulting from the lack of diversity. It is in fact actually a
cascade that may be more extreme than the views of any member!85 Thus, the
question legitimately is, if this is the understanding of the term, would you want it
if you could get it, or would the result to too diluted? A number of articles posit,
with neither understanding nor research, that it always results in the least common
denominator.
86
Done right, however, consensus is exactly the opposite: it is the wisdom of
crowds. It builds on the insights and experiences of diversity. And it is a vital
element of collaborative governance in terms of actually reaching agreement and
in terms of the quality of the resulting agreement. That undoubtedly sounds coun-
terintuitive, especially for the difficult, complex, controversial matters that are
customarily the subject of direct negotiations among governments and their con-
stituents. Indeed, you often hear that it can't be done. 87 One would expect that
the controversy would make consensus unlikely or that if concurrence were ob-
tained, it would likely be so watered down-that least common denominator
85. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (Or Hayek's Challenge To
Habermas), (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 321, 2007; Univ. of Chicago
Pub. Law Working Paper No. 146), available at http://ssm.comlabstractid=956189; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, (Univ. of Chi. Law School, John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 91, 1999), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=199668.
86. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Collaborative Environmental Law: Pro and Con, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
289, 297-98 (2007).
87. See, e.g., id. at 296 ("As appealing as this Rawlsian aspiration may be, it is not at all feasible for
making real-world decisions about major environmental problems. Environmental impacts are inhe-
rently diffuse, affecting large numbers of people; it is simply not possible for everyone affected by
major environmental problems to sit down and talk things over."); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO, & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 335-36 (Foundation Press 3d ed.
1999) (1985) ("Reg-neg will never prove effective as a means of issuing a major rule that has disparite
[sic] effects on many interests, however. No amount of negotiation can yield consensus with respect to
such a rule.") These bald assertions are supported by precisely zero citations and an equal amount of
analysis of some of the truly complex rules that have been negotiated. That is bombast, not scholar-
ship. Pierce, Shapiro, and Verkuil added a new sentence at the end of this section: "An empirical study
of the use of Reg-Neg found it does not save time, money, or resources, and that it does not reduce
conflict." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, & Paul R. Verkuil, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 348-49 (Foundation Press 5th ed. 2009). They cite Coglianese, supra note 31, for this propo-
sition. They do not, however, cite another empirical study that casts serious doubt on Coglianese's
research. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 31. Nor do they undertake a review of any of the extraordinarily
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again-that it would not be worth much. But, interestingly, it has exactly the
opposite effect.
Consensus can mean many things so it is important to understand what is
consensus for these purposes. The default definition of consensus in the Nego-
tiated Rulemaking Act is the "unanimous concurrence among the interests
represented on [the] . . . committee. '88 Thus, each interest has a veto over the
decision, and any party may block a final agreement by withholding concurrence.
Consensus has a significant impact on how the negotiations actually function:
It makes it "safe" to come to the table. If the committee were to
make decisions by voting, even if a supermajority were required, a
party might fear being outvoted. In that case, it would logically con-
tinue to build power to achieve its will outside the negotiations. In-
stead, it has the power inside the room to prevent something from
happening that it cannot live with. Thus, at least for the duration of
the negotiations, the party can focus on the substance of the policy
and not build political might.
" The committee is converted from a group of disparate, often antago-
nistic, interests into one with a common purpose: reaching a mutual-
ly acceptable agreement. During a policy negotiation such as this,
you can actually feel the committee snap together into a coherent
whole when the members realize that.
" It forces the parties to deal with each other which prevents "rolling"
someone: "OK, I have the votes, so shut up and let's vote." Rolling
someone in a negotiation is a very good way to create an opponent,
to you and to any resulting agreement. Having to actually listen to
each other also creates a friction of ideas that results in better deci-
sions-instead of a cascade, it generates the "wisdom of crowds."
" It enables the parties to make sophisticated proposals in which they
agree to do something, but only if other parties agree to do some-
thing in return. These "if but only if' offers cannot be made in a vot-
ing situation for fear that the offeror would not obtain the necessary
quid pro quo.
" It also enables the parties to develop and present information they
might otherwise be reluctant to share for fear of its being misused or
used against them. A veto prevents that.
" If a party cannot control the decision, it will logically amass as much
factual information as possible in order to limit the discretion availa-
ble to the one making the decision; the theory is that if you win on
the facts, the range of choices as to what to do on the policy is consi-
derably narrowed. Thus, records are stuffed with data that may well
88. 5 U.S.C. § 562(2) (2006).
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be irrelevant to the outcome or on which the parties largely agree. If
the decision is made by consensus, the parties do control the out-
come, and as a result, they can concentrate on making the final deci-
sion. The question for the committee then becomes, how much in-
formation do we need to make a responsible resolution? The com-
mittee may not need to resolve many of the underlying facts before a
policy choice is clear. Interestingly, therefore, the use of consensus
can significantly reduce the amount of defensive (or probably more
accurately, offensive) record-building that customarily attends ad-
versarial processes.
It forces the parties to look at the agreement as a whole-consensus
is reached only on the entire package, not its individual elements.
The very essence of negotiation is that different parties value issues
differently. What is important to one party is not so important to
another, and that makes for trades that maximize overall value. The
resulting agreement can be analogized to buying a house: something
is always wrong with any house you would consider buying (price,
location, kitchen needs repair, etc.), but you cannot buy only part of
a house or move it to another location; the choice must be made as to
which house-the entire thing-you will purchase.
" It also means that the resulting decision will not stray from the statu-
tory mandate. That is because one of the parties to the negotiation is
very likely to benefit from an adherence to the statutory require-
ments and would not concur in a decision that did not implement it.
89
" Finally, if all of the parties represented concur in the outcome, the li-
kelihood of a successful challenge is greatly reduced so that the de-
cision has a rare degree of finality.
89. It may be, of course, that all parties might be better off by a different scheme for achieving the
goal. For example, some scholars have argued that for some of the workplace hazards that are ad-
dressed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, everyone would be better off-
employee and employer alike-under a regime where better information as to the hazards were devel-
oped and then addressed through collective bargaining instead of the engineering standards dictated by
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See generally Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory
Mismatch In The Workplace: An Informational Approach to Workplace Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L.
REV. 1006 (2004). If this is indeed the case, then all parties may have an incentive to forget the statuto-
ry mandate and agree to the more efficient and effective scheme. But, that is what courts are for: judi-
cial review is available for anyone who is aggrieved by the deviation.
There has been an interesting debate over one negotiated rule that some allege is outside the scope of
the authorizing statute, but no one challenged it. Some have argued that the result is illegitimate; others
contend that it was obviously "close enough" and undoubtedly achieved the statutory goal did better
than if the statute's means had been rigorously met. Compare William Funk, Bargaining Toward the
New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J.
1351 (1997) with Philip J. Halter, In Search of Goldilocks: Democracy, Participation, and Govern-
ment, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 113 (2002). Whatever else, it also seems relevant to the debate that
the structure that was ultimately adopted was proposed by EPA, not some renegade committee. In that
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J. Agreement on a Proposed Rule
The goal of the committee is to reach an agreement on a proposed-not fi-
nal-rule.90 The agency must still use its normal process to convert the proposal
into a final rule, and it must comply with generally applicable norms of adminis-
trative law in doing so. Thus, if someone files a meritorious comment, the agency
will be required to change the proposal. 91 And, indeed, the agency likely is not
bound by the agreement and could change its mind either at the NPRM or final
rule stage. Judge Posner has questioned the ability of an agency to make such a
commitment, but his assertion came in a case in which it appeared there was in
fact no actual agreement. 92 Moreover, it seems likely that as a constitutional mat-
ter, it is fully authorized to change its mind when it believes that doing so would
better serve the public interest within the meaning of the operative statute.
While the agency likely has the legal authority to change its mind, it should
take the agreement, and its commitment under the agreement, very seriously lest it
both develop an immediate political problem for itself-the participants would
understandably be irked at spending considerable resources only to have the agen-
cy jilt them, and others might be reluctant to participate in the future if the agency
were to regard their contributions so callously. In short, the agency should have a
very good reason for changing its mind and should do so in only very unusual
situations.
93
K. A Variant of Collaborative Rulemaking
The process as has been developed is a relatively structured endeavor that is
designed to ensure that representatives of the affected parties identify the signifi-
cant issues, develop the relevant information, and work together to reach a mu-
tually acceptable outcome. The focus has been on the structure. But the structure
is in many ways a means to an end: an open-minded collaboration with the shared
quest of reaching an agreement that will be implemented. There are other impor-
tant ways by which this can be achieved besides empanelling a group of repre-
sentatives that meet as a group.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) (2006). The Negotiated Rulemaking Act provides: "[Tihe agency, to the
maximum extent possible consistent with the legal obligations of the agency, will use the consensus of
the committee with respect to the proposed rule as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency for
notice and comment." Id.
91. Some agencies empanel the reg neg committee after the NPRM to review the comments and to
provide its recommendation to the agency as to whether any changes are appropriate. For example, the
Coast Guard did that in its negotiated rulemaking for Vessel Response Plans under the Oil Pollution
Control Act of 1990. Vessel Response Plans, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,514
(proposed June 19, 1992) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 155); Vessel Response Plans, Interim Final
Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 7376, 7378 (Feb. 5, 1993) (to be codified in 33 C.F.R. pt. 155).
92. See USA Group Loan Servs., Inc., v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1996).
93. Meritorious comments submitted in response to an NPRM that point out information or policy
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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, used a variant of
the typical reg-neg process to develop its rule regarding the control of emissions
from nonroad diesel engines.94 As the agency explained:
EPA's strategy for the collaborative process required intensive stake-
holder outreach, involving one-on-one interaction with individual com-
panies and groups. This approach was effective for fostering a sense of
trust for the collaboration, and, moreover, the stakeholders claimed own-
ership of the rule, and were able to see their efforts in the final product.
What Made the Clean Air Nonroad Diesel Rule Unique
The Nonroad Diesel Rule was distinguished by the level and manner of
public involvement that went into creating it. EPA took time to actively
engage industry stakeholders early and all throughout the process. In con-
trast to standard practice, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
was also involved early in the process. The collaboration between OMB
and EPA allowed the rulemaking effort to proceed on an expedited basis.
Additionally, EPA employed a shuttle diplomacy approach. Essentially,
the Agency communicated directly with the broadly represented individ-
ual stakeholders rather than convening large groups from disparate sec-
tors .... Large gatherings impeded open communication because stake-
holders were concerned about revealing-thus compromising-
competitive advantage.95
EPA's analysis of the success of the undertaking included:
" a convener of stature (in this case, it was EPA, OMB, and the White
House itself);
" the agency was a committed leader in the collaborative process;
" the appropriate representatives were present; and
" a clearly defined purpose.9 6
This variant of the process clearly worked very well.97
I have been told that another example of this approach is the very recent pro-
posed rule on auto mileage and emissions that was announced on September 15,
94. See EPA Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 Fed.
Reg. 38,958 (June 29, 2004) (codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 69, 80, 86, 89, 94, 1039, 1048, 1051, 1065 &
1068).
95. U.S. EvNT'L. PROT. AGENCY, SOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS THROUGH
COLLABORATION-A CASE STUDY, available at http://www.epa.gov/ncei/collaboration
nonroaddiesel.pdf.
96. Id.
97. In addition to the positive description provided by the agency itself, I interviewed a number of
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982009. There are many indications that a process similar to the one described
above was used to craft a general agreement on the proposal.
V. CONCEPTUAL CRITICISMS
A number of conceptual criticisms have been leveled against the notion of
collaborating on policy, many of which really are rooted in the idea that only an
agency can determine and impose policy and that it should do so unilaterally. 99
Much, indeed probably most, of the conceptual criticism of collaboration is a re-
pudiation that the private sector has a substantive role in making public decisions.
And this, in turn, relies on a misconception of the New Deal, expert model so
wonderfully articulated by Professor Stewart:
Defenders flaunted the breadth of the discretion afforded the new agen-
cies by Congress, maintaining that such discretion was necessary if the
agencies were to discharge their planning and managerial functions suc-
cessfully and restore health to the various sectors of the economy for
which they were responsible. Given the assumption that the agencies'
role was that of manager or planner with an ascertainable goal, "exper-
tise" could plausibly be advocated as a solution to the problem of discre-
tion if the agency's goal could be realized through the knowledge that
comes from specialized experience. For in that case the discretion that
the administrator enjoys is more apparent than real. The policy to be set
is simply a function of the goal to be achieved and the state of the world.
There may be a trial and error process in finding the best means of
achieving the posited goal, but persons subject to the administrator's con-
trol are no more liable to his arbitrary will than are patients remitted to
the care of a skilled doctor. This analysis underlay the notion that admin-
istrators were not political, but professional, and that public administra-
tion has an objective basis. It also supported arguments by New Deal de-
fenders that it would be unwise for the Congress to lay down detailed
prescriptions in advance, and intolerably inefficient to require administra-
tors to follow rigid judicial procedures. 100
Note, importantly, the argument is that the existence of technocratic expertise
limits discretion and hence legitimizes a broad grant of authority to the agency. It
does not say that the body politic should defer to agencies because they are ex-
perts. Rather, the expertise must come first. Nor does the theory say that only the
agencies are experts and that only they have the answers.
98. Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 (proposed Sept. 28, 2009).
99. Indeed, that argument even extends to excluding the White House and the Executive Office of
the President: the agency and the agency alone decides. See, e.g., Public Comments on OMB Recom-
mendations for a new Executive Order on Regulatory Review, available at http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/jsplEOlfedRegReview/publicComments.jsp. See also Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Con-
trol of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. Ui. L. REV. 443, 462 (1987).
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Let's examine some of the criticisms.
A. Inappropriate Departure from an Agency-centric Process
Although collaboration might appear to be an abrupt, and perhaps illegitimate
or even illegal, departure from the traditional "agency-centric" process, if properly
done, it is not: no policy will be made without the explicit concurrence of the
agency. Hence it is not delegation by the agency to private actors. 10 1 This may
seem naive and far more theoretical than reflecting what actually occurs-it is
often alleged in the literature that agencies "sell out" in order to achieve agree-
ment.102 But, as one who has seen a lot of these things in action, I have never seen
that happen. Indeed, if it did, the agency would quite logically and realistically be
concerned about getting hammered by Congress, if not a court. To be sure, some
in the agency may not be happy with the outcome, just as they would not be in any
policy process; that is the nature of the internal policy debate since agencies are
not monoliths. Is the result different than if the agency went it alone? To be sure!
That is precisely why you do it.
But the result must still be within the agency's envelope, and it probably
achieved its initial goal better. Indeed, the objective of the agency in the negotia-
tions should be to achieve whatever goal it would seek to achieve in a traditional
policy process. Thus, the agency's role in a negotiation is precisely the same as in
the traditional concept of an agency:
" the negotiations supplement its information base, just as notice and
comment or hybrid procedures do;
" the agency is still as much of an expert as it was before;
" the final decision is the agency's-even though the others agree with
it; and
" the agency-in all its magic-divines just what the public interest is,
but with a little help from its friends.
B. Only Agencies Know Where to Find the Public Interest
Another criticism is that collaborating in a decision changes the nature of the
agency. In this view, only agencies are able to determine just what is the "public
interest."' 10 3 This, of course, raises some interesting questions: foremost is just
what we mean by the "public interest." What are its components; what goes into
its calculations? It is treated almost as if it were something real, something tangi-
101. One senior agency official quipped that she and she alone was empowered to make the decision,
but it sure didn't hurt to have the others agreeing with her!
102. Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 93,93-113 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, eds., 200 1).
103. Funk, supra note 89; William Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation
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ble, something explicit. If so, where does it live? Where is stored? It is asserted
as if it were the famously rejected "brooding omnipresence.''104 But even if it did
exist, why is it that only government officials can see it or interpret it like the
Oracles at Delphi, and likely with similarly accurate results? Instead, the "public
interest"-whatever it may be-is determined through careful analysis and the
clash of ideas and interests: precisely the stuff of deliberative collaboration.
Indeed, collaboration does not change the duty of the agency in ensuring that
the decision is within statutory bounds and achieves the evanescent public inter-
est. 10 5 What is different, however, is the attitude of the agency. Instead of the
traditional process in which it functions as if it were acting unilaterally after con-
sultation, the agency recognizes the legitimate views and welcomes the actual
participation of those affected in making the decision.
C. Civic Republicanism
Collaboration is also consistent with the ideas of civic republicanism that cel-
ebrate careful deliberation. 106 In the traditional concept that deliberation takes
place within the agency itself, it is now largely enforced by tenets of administra-
tive law that push a "rational" decision. But the deliberation of civic republican-
ism can also be coupled with modem notions of democracy in the form of collabo-
ration under procedures that foster the vaunted deliberation across a broader reach
of participants.
D. The New Order
It would be better to recognize a new, more realistic concept of the agency in
the post command-and-control era. Now is the time to recognize that much, if not
the vast bulk, of the technical expertise lies in the private sector. And yet, much
of the criticism is as if Dick Stewart's transmission belt' °7 was still cranking away
with agencies delivering the goods for Congress through their dispassionate exper-
tise. That level of expertise probably never existed, and it certainly does not now.
Clearly, as any observer or even remote participant can see, agencies do not make
technocratic decisions in isolation. Rather, they are already buffeted by multiple
forces: the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (O1RA); the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB); the other parts of the Executive Office of the
President (ExOp); the President himself; Congress as a whole but more likely its
many, many committees; the courts; and, finally, by public participation itself. It
104. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945). After reviewing such a conception of the
common law, Mr. Justice Holmes famously asserted: "[b]ut there is no such body of law." Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Nor eighty years later does the public interest exist as an ascertainable doc-
trine with independent existence.
105. ECR Basic Principles are as follows: ensure decisions are implementable consistent with federal
law and policy. INTERAGENCY INITIATIVE TO FOSTER COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICr RESOLUTION, BRIEFING REPORT FOR FEDERAL DEPARTMENT
LEADERSHIP, June 2004 (Revised May 2005), available at http://www.ecr.gov/pdf/BR.pdf.
106. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond The Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
107. Stewart, supra note 100, at 1676-1677.
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is time to appreciate that agencies are part of a constellation and to adapt the un-
derlying theory of administrative law to that political reality.
There are many ideas and ways to achieve the public goal. Statutes rarely
dictate a single result; rather the agency retains discretion. If not, there is nothing
to negotiate anyhow; for that matter using notice and comment would be super-
fluous. If the agency is sure of the result, it should not use collaboration since, as
the criteria described above indicate, it should be used only when the outcome is
genuinely in doubt. Agency officials and staff have no monopoly on seeing the
public interest. While the role of the agency is to ensure conformance to legisla-
tive and public policy requirements, the means of doing so may be better devel-
oped by a broader involvement. Or, as the old expression has it: agency steers;
private sector rows. 108
VI. RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH COLLABORATION
What follows is a bit harsh and intentionally provocative. But the core is real
and needs to be addressed if we are to tap the potential of collaborative gover-
nance. It is based on my own observations and experience, as well as discussions
with public and private participants, senior agency officials, and many senior me-
diators.
A. Convening
It appears to be fairly common now for agencies to take significant shortcuts
in convening the committee-assembling those with whom it will negotiate or
collaborate. 1°9 A consequence is that agencies not infrequently appoint the repre-
sentatives of the respective interests-indeed the interests themselves--even
though that violates the theory of what is at stake, as has been recognized repeat-
edly.1" ° As a result, less effort is being made to ensure that all of the parties are
there and that the issues are carefully defined before the deliberations start. Most
mediators, on the other hand, view it as a-if not the--critical phase of the
process. And, indeed, a convening usually expedites the deliberations themselves
by providing a common framework and orientation to all the parties on which the
can build collectively. As a result, convening is more an investment as opposed to
a bother.
108. DAVID OSBORNE AND TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRE-
NEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 25 (1993).
109. Either the agency will simply choose from among those whom it already assumes would be
interested, or in might put out a call for those who are interested to identify themselves to the agency.
In either event, there is little or no outreach to identify other interests- those who are not the usual
suspects-or to understand the political dynamics of their varying perspectives.
110. MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 22 (ECR Basic Prin-
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B. Consensus
Although agencies continue to collaborate, more of their effort is directed to-
wards a collaboration-working together" 'I-shy of agreement. In such a
process, the agency makes it clear from the outset that it will make the final
choice; the agency remains in charge. The argument goes that you get "almost
everything" from such an arrangement, as contrasted with one that seeks a con-
sensus on an agreement. But, of course, some major things are missing: most
importantly a resolution of the controversial, difficult issues and help in imple-
mentation. This naturally raises serious concerns over implementation: how
many of these "collaboration lite" processes are actually implemented in a timely
fashion?" 12 Moreover, it would be interesting to assess the quality of the results-
my experience is that they are nowhere near as deep.
C. Agency Expertise
When the agency is in fact an expert in the subject of the negotiation, the
process is exciting indeed. The agency can lead, and the private sector challenges
and extends the ideas developed. A form of peer review results in a collaborative
quest for that elusive public interest. A retired career agency participant recently
wrote in response to my sending him the brochure for a conference on collabora-
tive governance and said the reg-neg "project is one I was most proud of-both in
terms of the process and the ... good that it accomplished." Exciting indeed.
But when the agency is not really an expert that is intimate with the state of
the art, there are frequently problems with the negotiations: the issues are not
joined nearly as intensely, and the agency often hides behind a rouge notion of
expertise. Instead, the exchange will degenerate into, "We're right simply be-
cause we are the agency," while it mindlessly invokes the notion-if not the
fact-of expertise as the reason for deference. The insecurity is accompanied by a
need to control the results of the process, and senior officials will often not con-
front the other participants for fear of not prevailing. Rather, it will simply change
the result after the agreement or recommendation. 113
It appears to me and to many that I interviewed, both in and out of govern-
ment, that the level of expertise-knowledge of the state of the art-is decreasing
for many reasons. One, certainly, is the lack of funding for the agencies to do
their jobs right after being assigned their duties by Congress. As a result, agencies
simply cannot afford to hire or retain the expertise on their internal staffs. Moreo-
ver, until very recently, government service has not been as fashionable as it once
was. For thirty years, Presidents have run against those who work for the gov-
ernment and demeaned their efforts. The new hires often lack broad, technical
experience. Expertise is not as valued for promotion as it used to be since the
11I. See Ansell, supra note 23; Jeffery Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortu-
nate) Waning Of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 1001-1002 (2008).
112. While I have not conducted such an analysis recently, when I did a number of years ago, it was
clear that such procedures lagged significantly in actually achieving their desired results.
113. 1 wish to emphasize that this particular observation was raised in interviews I conducted with
several senior agency officials. It was not originally my own.
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current theory seems to be that everyone needs to be a manager.114 But technolo-
gy is moving too fast, and hence agencies cannot keep up the current state of the
art. If this is true, as indeed it appears to be, we need to get rid of the 1930s no-
tion of expertise as a basis for legitimacy and deference once and for all.
Parties that have on-going relationships with the agency find it difficult to be
open and honest in a negotiation for fear that it will be held against them in future
dealings. This is, of course, a difficult issue in which an agency occupies a num-
ber of different positions at the table. Overcoming this requires concentration and
an explicit effort to disentangle the relationship.
D. Communication within the Agency
The staff and political appointees within the agency seem estranged from one
another. While that alone is difficult enough, there is an additional dimension
when the relationship between the agency politicos and those in ExOp are factored
in: it seems to me that those in the agency are far more sensitive and suspicious of
being preempted than has been customary. All of this is likely a function of the
current hyper-partisanship in Washington, and I surely hope that will die down
soon since it is so counterproductive on so many fronts." 5 As an example of this,
I have been in negotiations at more than one agency where the senior staff repre-
sentative on the committee would not be in the same room as the political level
boss-if you got one, you didn't get the other. Moreover, I have frequently been
instructed not to talk to any political appointee.
The operational staff and the political appointees had very different views,
and each tried to keep decisions away from the other." 6 Each seems to feel they
are protecting the final decision from the depredations of the other. Another di-
mension of the struggle is that some staff reported they fear retribution for making
a wrong decision and hence temporized until the political winds were more clear;
this too is indicative of a serious lack of communication and management.
It is certainly hard-no, impossible-to negotiate or reach closure that way!
There is no view, position, or interest because there is no internal agreement and
certainly no leadership. This has to be having an effect broader than negotiations.
We clearly need leadership within the agency. Staff would logically be reluc-
tant to use a collaborative process if they thought they would be blamed or de-
moted for doing so. If management wants to look tough, staff certainly won't
want to do this stuff. More fundamentally, collaboration is a means to achieving
your pre-existing interests in a way that better fulfills your objective. If there is no
objective, collaboration is merely unproductive talk.
If, as has been reported on several occasions, staff feel significantly inhibited
from initiating collaborative processes, management needs to emphasize that no
retaliation, or any other adverse action, will result from initiating a collaborative
process. Moreover, staff need to be encouraged to do so, and promotions should
114. See generally PAUL C. LIGHT, THE NEW PUBLIC SERVICE 8-13 (1999).
115. 1 emphasize that this is not a function of which party is in power-it started when the political
wars started a decade ago.
116. The SES seems caught in the middle of this tug of war and consequently seem less effective to
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be based on doing it well. 1 7 Thus, how well an agency manager and the imme-
diate staff perform in a collaboration should be taken into account in a perfor-
mance review. While that is currently a standard, it is not rigorously imple-
mented.
E. Lack of Commitment to the Result
Even when the agency has signed off on an agreement or recommendation, it
often feels free to change it without new evidence or a reason that did not exist at
the time to repudiate its explicit concurrence. This cavalier attitude simply de-
stroys the idea of collaboration. During my interviews, several people-in and
out of agencies-thought that agencies put together a committee just so they could
say they did it but with no intention of abiding by any sort of recommendation or
agreement. Not surprisingly in such circumstances outsiders become reluctant to
do it again: why bother? Lack of good faith is never a good idea.
F. Professionalism of the Process
An agency obviously does not need a neutral for all collaborations. Rather,
the need is proportional to the degree of entropy-the greater the chaos and com-
plexity, the greater the need for a skilled professional. Unfortunately, however,
concomitant with the breakdown in communication, a second guessing of the
neutrals as to process design and implementation of collaborative processes has
also increased; they are related through a common desire to control. Neutrals are
then treated as "contactors" as opposed to "professionals." A contractor (in legal
parlance, the servant) can be directed by the master: we hired you so we can tell
you precisely what to do! They are clearly not viewing the neutral as a peer or
person with valuable experience and expertise. That has serious consequences for
the efficacy of the process since it strips away the experience and expertise of the
neutral. Surely the agency would not-at least this law professor hopes not-say
to a lawyer, "We hired you so change your opinion to authorize us to do what we
want."
A collaborative process requires skill and dexterity to do right; it is not some-
thing that functions well on an ad hoc basis. Collaboration will, therefore, be
significantly enhanced when it is recognized that it, like other procedures, requires
and merits professional guidance.
117. For example, the SES has five Executive Core Qualifications. U.S. Office of Personnel Man-
agement, Executive Core Qualifications (ECQs), http://www.opm.gov/ses/recruitment/ecq.asp (last
visited Dec. 29, 2009). Among them are the following:
ECQ 3 is Results Driven. "This core qualification involves the ability to meet organizational goals
and customer expectations. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to make decisions that produce high-
quality results by applying technical knowledge, analyzing problems, and calculating risks." Id. De-
sired competencies include accountability; customer service; decisiveness; entrepreneurship; problem
solving; and technical credibility. Id.
ECQ 5 is Building Coalitions: "This core qualification involves the ability to build coalitions inter-
nally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit and private sector organ-
izations, foreign governments, or international organizations to achieve common goals." 1d. Desired
competencies include partnering; political savvy; and influencing/negotiating. Id.
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VII. LACK OF ENCOURAGEMENT/ACTIVE DISCOURAGEMENT BY OMB
AND THE WHITE HOUSE
Executive Order 12,866 provides:
Each agency shall ... provide the public with meaningful participation in
the regulatory process.... Each agency also is directed to explore and,
where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for developing regula-
tions, including negotiated rulemaking." 
8
Soon after this encouraging development, however, it became clear that OMB
actively discouraged the use of negotiated rulemaking/collaboration and made it
difficult for agencies to implement the directive. The putative reason for this op-
position was that the President is entitled to make the final decision on all regula-
tions-he is, as it has been recently termed, "the decider," or, as the more prosaic
administrative law term has it, "presidential rulemaking" has replaced the tradi-
tional agency-centric version. 1 9 Under this view, the notion was that the Presi-
dent's plenary power would be diminished if a rule were developed through colla-
boration since the President would have to buck the expressed will of potentially
important constituents if he chose to take a different approach. 12° The argument
followed that the President would be inhibited from exercising this constitutional
prerogative if his decision would be revealed, and that revelation would raise the
stakes since the reason for the reversal had better be good to thwart the collective
views of the public as expressed in the consensus. The sunshine that results seems
to inhibit the political apparatus.
OIRA, under OMB, argued by extension that it, too, enjoyed similar preroga-
tives since, under the Executive Order, the President has entrusted it, at least in the
first instance, to review rules. Thus, it sees itself as the President's political
surrogate.
These views are wrong in a number of dimensions. By way of an introducto-
ry background, let me emphasize that I am a strong supporter of White House
review of rules. Twenty years ago, I was on a panel at American University Law
School-directly across the street from the collaborative governance conference at
which this paper was initially presented-defending White House oversight of
rules. 122 It was not a popular position that day. Indeed, I was one of the original
designers of White House involvement that led to Executive Order 12,044.123
118. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3.
119. See Peter Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 965 (1997) (for the origin of
the term "Presidential Rulemaking"); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245 (2001) (for a description of current practices).
120. Note that this would be the case whether the President purported to be able to unilaterally change
the rule without the concurrence of the agency as is embodied in the term "decider" or whether the
President directed the agency to change the rule. Under the later approach, the President does not have
the authority to change the rule itself, but could remove the agency official for not complying with his
request. In either event, the rule is changed.
121. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3.
122. See Philip Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 557 (1987).
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Hence, I am a long time advocate for review, but not of preemption or substitution
of judgment.
The assertion of a "decider" is not only wrong from a constitutional perspec-
tive,' 24 it is also wrong politically. As President Obama's Memorandum for the
Heads of Agencies emphasizes, openness and transparency are critical for "public
trust" and to provide important accountability.1 25 Thus, there is positive value in
requiring public officials-including the President-to explain why they are re-
versing an agency's decision to go in a different direction. Moreover, there needs
to be a creative tension between the President and the "officers" to whom Con-
gress entrusted the decision. I have personally observed two occasions when the
President said he wanted to do something and the agency head said, "No, you can
fire me, but I will not make the change." In both cases the official was not fired;
the President did not want to take the political heat. 26 That is an important check
on excessive and stealthy presidential directives.
Presidential rulemaking-and excessively frisky OMB review-is also a ma-
jor factor in the breakdown of communication within agencies. It diminishes the
role of agencies, and, hence, makes them less attractive places to be. It also raises
the political ante. Finally, an arrogant substitution of judgment frequently results
in less-informed decisions. The recent failure of General Motors is a vivid exam-
ple of the efficacy of this type of top-down decision-making.
The new administration appears poised-at least in the abstract-to address
these concerns. That first memo from the new administration begins with the
following statement, "My Administration is committed to creating an unprece-
dented level of openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the
public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and colla-
boration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and
effectiveness in Government."
' 127
Perhaps that will extend to ExOp as well. Moreover, one can still preserve
the prerogatives of the President and OMB without inhibiting the other important
goals of that statement: public participation, collaboration, democracy, efficiency,
and effectiveness. Those are powerful attributes indeed.
As has been developed throughout this paper, it is essential for the agency to
set the parameters of a regulatory decision when entering into a collaboration. So,
too, for ExOp: like the agency, it needs to set boundaries in advance for the agen-
cy. A manager should set the variables and perimeters in advance, not second-
guessing after the fact. As the negotiations/deliberations begin to converge to-
wards resolution, the agency should check with its management (ExOp) to ensure
its views are taken into account.12 8 Those views can then be addressed by the
124. See generally Peter Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
125. Memorandum, Transparency and Open Government, supra note 2.
126. It seems to me that it would have been far better if EPA Administrator Whitman had forced Bush
to fire her instead of quitting quietly. In that way, the American people could have known directly
what the issues were instead of being led to believe that all was well. See, Nicholas Rabinowitsh,
Bringing New Source Review Back: The Supreme Court's Surprise (And Disguised) Attack on Grand-
fathering Old Coal Plants in Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy, 31 ENV. L. & POL. J. 251, 266-
267 (2008).
127. Memorandum, Transparency and Open Government, supra note 2.
128. See supra text accompanying note 89.
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collaborators-refined or perhaps even rejected but with a solid explanation-and,
of course, management could then reject the rejection but it would be public, as it
should be.
Indeed, in this case, the review by ExOp of a policy developed through colla-
boration should receive less, not more, scrutiny: it is the marketplace of ideas in
operation. Someone, likely ExOp, still needs to ensure that the proper players
were there operating under procedures designed to ensure deliberation within the
boundaries expressed by ExOp. Such willingness would be a major incentive to
use the process and would result in better rules. That was the process largely fol-
lowed in the Reagan and the first Bush administrations, and it certainly seems
consistent with the Obama memorandums.
VI. RECOMMENDATION FOR NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER
As part of its review of Executive Order 12,866,29 OMB established a docket
for interested people to submit comments and proposed revisions.' 30 In keeping
with the analysis above, I proposed the following:
Use of Collaboration
Each agency is directed to consider the use of collaboration where appro-
priate to develop new rules and policies. In doing so, the agency needs to
determine what form of collaboration will best fulfill its needs. When
making this decision, the agency should consult with representatives of
the major interests that will be affected by the decision and clearly define
the goals to be achieved through the collaboration.
If the agency decides that its goal is to develop a rule or policy collabora-
tively, which is encouraged, then it should:
1. engage in an outreach to identify representatives of the interests that
would be substantially affected by the dtecision. A successful colla-
boration must reflect a sufficient diversity of views that the agency
can be reasonably assured that the major issues will be addressed in
the deliberations;
2. publish in the Federal Register, on its Web site, and in places where
affected individuals are likely to read it, a notice that the agency is:
a. planning to use a collaborative process to develop the poli-
cy, and
129. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3.
130. General Services Administration, Public Comments on OMB Recommendations for a New Ex-
ecutive Order on Regulatory Review, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/
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b. inviting anyone to participate if they believe they will be
substantially affected by the policy in a way that is signifi-
cantly different from any one already participating;
3. actively participate in the deliberations;
4. consult with OIRA with respect to the issues to be addressed, the de-
liberations thus far, and the range of potential outcomes before
reaching a final agreement on a rule that is subject to this Executive
Order so that OIRA's views may be taken into account in developing
any agreement;
5. explicitly concur in any final agreement;
6. consistent with its legal obligations, use the result of the collabora-
tion as the basis for its proposed rule or policy; and
7. when submitting a rule or other policy to OIRA pursuant to this Or-
der, describe any collaborative process the agency used in its devel-
opment, including whether or not the rule or policy reflects a con-
sensus of the participants in the collaboration. If it does not, the
agency shall provide a brief description as to why.
IX. THE FUTURE OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
Collaboration can be powerful indeed. Government can leverage its role and
view of the public interest while gaining state-of-the-art technical information. It
can tap creative ideas from those directly affected and who have extensive prac-
tical insight into the issues to be resolved. But before that can be achieved, the
government must repair internal communication. It cannot hide behind control to
make up for a lack of expertise, and it must recognize the unique qualities of the
government and do them very well. Mutual commitment is essential to achieving
those goals.
It will need to build on the procedures that ensure broad views and participa-
tion: a rigorous convening to ensure the appropriate parties are there to negotiate
the issues in controversy. Collaboration solely between the agency and the regu-
lated may ignore the beneficiaries and those otherwise affected; the agency, there-
fore, needs to make sure the others are appropriately represented as a check on
rent seeking. The notice of intent is designed to serve as such a check and to im-
prove the dynamics at the table, and it clearly signals that the issues will be de-
cided at the table instead of in another forum.
With suitable attention to detail, collaboration can be a powerful means of
achieving the public goals, whatever they may be.
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